



Insights for Dept of the Interior Reorganization from the DoD Experience with Establishing Unified Command

November 9, 2017



Agenda

- DoD Unified Command Today
- Evolution of Unified Command
- Key Considerations
- Issues and Tensions
- Implications for Department of the Interior
- DoD Techniques to Overcome Resistance or Obstacles to Change



Unified Command Today

- Six geographic unified commands in DoD. Pacific Command (PACOM), Central Command (CENTCOM), Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), Northern Command (NORTHCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Africa Command (AFRICOM)



- A **Unified Command** is a command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments

Unified Command Today: U.S. Central Command




President/Secretary of Defense

US Central Command

Staff

Commander has full authority over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations





Key Terms

- **Unity of effort** requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure
- **Unity of command** all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. *Unity of command requires that two commanders may not exercise the same command relationship over the same force at any one time*



Evolution of Unified Command in U.S. Armed Forces (1 of 2)

- Pre WWII: Army and Navy operated separately--sometimes cooperated (unity of effort)--but not unified command
- WWII. Operations of great complexity mandate unified command
 - Debacle at Pearl Harbor
 - Inability to agree in Pacific to an overall unified command
 - Gen Eisenhower in N. Africa and Europe: a unified commander whose experience greatly shaped his post-war thinking as President
- Unified Command Plan: 1946: created seven unified commands
- National Security Act of 1947 and 1958 DoD Reorganization Act fostered continued maturation of unified command
- Vietnam: failure to achieve unified command

"We must never fight another war the way that we fought the last two. I have the feeling that if the Army and Navy had fought our enemies as hard as they fought each other, the war would have ended much earlier." -Pres Truman



Evolution of Unified Command (2 of 2)

- The evolution of unified command is replete with conflict between the Navy (who typically favored independence) and the Army and Air Force (who supported unification)
- Typically took the Congress and/or the President to broker a deal
- Three separate laws drove necessary changes
- Post Vietnam: Unified Command has been the rule in DoD



Benefits of Unified Command

- Achieve integration of effects in a geographic area
- Present a single face to other nations and entities
- Builds-in cooperation
- Fosters efficient use of resources—sharing, etc
- Simplifies Command and Control for the Department of Defense—fewer local issues to resolve—issues are solved at echelons below department headquarters, resulting in more timely and responsive action



Key Considerations & Issues

- Most **funding** (pay, procurement, construction, research/development, operations) still controlled by the Department headquarters (Army, Navy, etc). This is a source of tension
- Unified Commands express their priorities and military departments try to satisfy them
- Departments do not retain control of their units and forces, but keep **administrative control** of their personnel for assignment, promotion, schooling and retirement. They also prescribe doctrine, training, organizational design and manage procurement programs
- Challenges occasionally occur at the “**seams**” between Unified Commands, example: Pacific Command has India in its area, while Central Command has Pakistan. Many issues span these two countries



Implications for Department of the Interior

- Expect whatever organizational structure is created to require modifications and improvements over time. Perfection is not achieved on the first, or even second pass
- Congressional and state governor support (or lack of focused opposition) is key
- Particular attention should be placed on funding streams and authorities. DoD continues to fund through Departments, but this causes concern. Adequate checks and balances must be in place including avenues for appeal
- There must be an incentive for local offices to work through the Joint Management Area for help, versus their parent bureau. Admonishments are not enough; resources/help must be available through JMA, or they will bypass and go to their bureau



DoD Techniques Overcome Resistance or Obstacles to Change

- Conduct **pilot programs** of smaller scope. Typically using an area that includes most of the components, but doesn't introduce undo complications. Stack deck with talented leaders who have "bought in"
- Divide execution into **phases** and celebrate incremental steps, putting hardest phases later to generate momentum early
 - Example: Phase I. Pilot Program. Demonstrate concept & value. Phase II. Obtain legislative authority. Phase III. Expand Pilot. Phase IV. Full implementation
 - Alternatively: Phase I. JMA established as "coordinating" centers. Phase II. JMAs fully in "chain of command"
- Establish "**virtual**" **lines of communication** before getting enmeshed in physical relocation of assets
- Seek **win-win**, versus win-lose
- Conduct **Strategic communications campaigns** with FAQs
- Enlist key **allies**



References

- Andrew Feickert, *“The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands,”* Congressional Research Service, January 3, 2013.
- David Jablonsky, *“War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command,”* The Yale Library of Military History, Yale University Press, 2010.
- Ronald Cole, et al, *“The History of the Unified Command Plan 1946-1993,”* Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington DC, February 1995
- Joint Publication 1, *“Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States,”* Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, March 25, 2013

Notes Summary:

No speaker notes are contained in this presentation.